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Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
to Survey Existing Arrangements Relating to
Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence

*Keep in
the interest*

THE PROBLEM

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the undersigned ad hoc Committee was appointed to survey the adequacy of existing arrangements relating to the production of scientific and technical intelligence to meet the needs of the various governmental departments and agencies, and, as well, to meet the needs of national intelligence. The Committee has considered two aspects of this general problem, namely:

1. The adequacy of existing allocations of primary responsibility for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, and
2. The adequacy of existing mechanisms for coordinating and integrating the production of scientific and technical intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of its survey, the ad hoc Committee has concluded:

1. That there is no need for further direction by the
National Security Council
of NSCID No. [REDACTED]

responsibilities in the field of scientific and technical intelligence subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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2. That existing implementation of the Council's Directive is inadequate and that DCID 3/3, promulgated under the provision of paragraph 3 of NSCID No. 3, should be rescinded and replaced by a new DCI Directive which:

a. more adequately particularizes production responsibilities in the fields of scientific and technical intelligence.

b. establishes a Scientific Estimates Committee to integrate scientific and technical intelligence as and when required for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and guide interagency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS. A draft of such a DCI Directive is attached as TAB A.

3. That, while many of the difficulties which have beset the coordination of scientific and technical intelligence may be cured by the proposed new directive, there is no assurance of this and the IAC should re-examine the problem in six months time with a view to determining whether further action is required.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The ad hoc Committee recommends that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the IAC, issue proposed DCI Directive 3/4 (TAB A), and
2. The IAC re-examine this problem six months thereafter.

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DISCUSSION

1. Surveys of the activities of IAC Agencies relating to scientific and technical intelligence have indicated that inadequate cooperation, confusion with respect to delineations of responsibilities, and undesirable duplication have existed in the production of scientific and technical intelligence. Accordingly, the Director of Central Intelligence requested interested members of the IAC to designate representatives to sit as an ad hoc committee, under the chairmanship of CIA's Deputy Director/Intelligence, to consider the adequacy of existing arrangements relating to the production of scientific and technical intelligence for the needs of the various governmental departments and agencies and, as well, for the needs of national intelligence. The DCI specifically requested that such representatives be selected on the basis of interest in and authority over intelligence production in general, as distinguished from the relatively specialized field of scientific and technical intelligence. In response to this request, such representatives were designed as follows:

<u>Representatives</u>	<u>Representing</u>
Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Chairman	CIA
Col. Floyd E. Dunn	Joint Staff
Col. James F. Pinkney	USAF
Col. G. B. Coverdale	Army
Capt. Kenneth C. Hurd	Navy
Mr. William C. Trueheart	State
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson	AEC

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2. The ad hoc committee thus designated convened for its first meeting on 31 March 1952, and has had in all eleven meetings. At two of these meetings, scientific and technical intelligence specialists from the Military Services and from CIA met with the Committee in order to express their views on certain specialized aspects of the over-all problem.

3. Early in its deliberations, the ad hoc committee concluded that there were two separable but related aspects of the over-all problem which should be considered. These were:

a. The adequacy of existing allocations of primary responsibility for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, and

b. The adequacy of existing mechanisms for coordinating and integrating the production of scientific and technical intelligence.

4. As respects the adequacy of existing allocations of production responsibility in the scientific and technical field, the Committee referred to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the two currently governing Directives in this field, namely, NSCID No. 3 and DCID No. 3/3. The National Security Act provides in pertinent part (Sec. 102(d)):

"...it shall be the duty of the (Central Intelligence) Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council...

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"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: ...Provided... That the departments and other agencies of the government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence..."

"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally....."

5. NSCID No. 3 governing generally the integration of intelligence production, provides in pertinent part:

"2. The research facilities required by any agency to process its own current and staff intelligence shall be adequate to satisfy its individual needs after taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies. Each agency shall endeavor to maintain adequate research facilities, not only to accomplish the intelligence production tasks allocated to it directly under the foregoing provisions but also to provide such additional intelligence reports or estimates within its field of dominant interest as may be necessary to satisfy the requirements of the other agencies under such allocations.

"3. For the purposes of intelligence production, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests:

Political, Cultural,	
Sociological Intelligence.....	Department of State
Military Intelligence.....	Department of the Army
Naval Intelligence.....	Department of the Navy
Air Intelligence.....	Department of the Air Force
Economic, Scientific and	Each agency in accordance
<u>Technological*</u>	with its respective
<u>Intelligence</u>	needs"

*The term "technical" as used in this report is synonymous with the term "technological" as used in NSCID No. 3, par. 3.

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6. The needs of the various departments and agencies as respects departmental intelligence are indicated by paragraph 1 d. of NSCID No. 3, which provides:

"d. Departmental Intelligence

(1) Departmental intelligence is that intelligence including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department or Independent Agency of the Federal Government, and the subordinate units thereof, to execute its mission and to discharge its lawful responsibilities."

Pertinent also to an understanding of departmental intelligence needs is the following discussion of "Staff Intelligence," as contained in paragraph 1. c. of NSCID No. 3:

"c. Staff Intelligence

(1) Staff intelligence is that intelligence prepared by any department or agency through the correlation and interpretation of all intelligence materials available to it in order to meet its specific requirements and responsibilities.

(2) Each intelligence agency has the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of such staff intelligence as its own department shall require. It is recognized that the staff intelligence of each of the departments must be broader in scope than any allocation of collection responsibility or recognition of dominant interest might indicate. In fact, the full foreign intelligence picture is of interest in varying degrees at different times to each of the departments.

(3) Any intelligence agency, either through the Director of Central Intelligence or directly, may call upon other appropriate agencies for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. Such requests shall be made upon the agencies in accordance with their production capabilities and dominant interest.

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(4) As a part of the coordination program, the Director of Central Intelligence will seek the assistance of the IAC intelligence agencies in minimizing the necessity for any agency to develop intelligence in fields outside its dominant interests.

(5) The CIA and the agencies shall, for purposes of coordination, exchange information on projects and plans for the production of staff intelligence.

(6) It shall be normal practice that staff intelligence of one agency is available to the other intelligence agencies permanently represented on the IAC."

7. The needs of the Director of Central Intelligence as respects national intelligence are indicated by paragraph 1. e of NSCID No. 3, which provides:

"e. National Intelligence

(1) National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one Department or Agency and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment.

(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence

(3) The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAC Agencies in order that he may obtain from them within the limits of their capabilities the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence.

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, by agreement with the pertinent Agency or Agencies, request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual Departments or Agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

8. DCID No. 3/3 does not particularize the allocation of production responsibilities in the field of scientific and technical intelligence; instead, that Directive establishes "a permanent interdepartmental Scientific Intelligence Committee" (SIC) in order to "plan, support, and coordinate the production of scientific intelligence as it affects the national security." Under DCID No. 3/3, any more specific allocation of production responsibilities in the scientific field is delegated to working subcommittees to be established by the SIC (under paragraph 4 of DCID No. 3/3) and operating under its over-all jurisdiction. Among the functions assigned to such working committees is that of:

"allocation, by agreement of the IAC agencies, of responsibilities for production by the various participating agencies;" (DCID No. 3/3, para. 4 d.)

9. The Committee agreed, after considering these two Directives, that there is no need for further direction by the National Security Council at this time, since, under the provisions of NSCID No. 3, there is an adequate general allocation of production responsibilities in the field of scientific and technical intelligence (paralleling in generality the provisions made with respect to other specialized fields of intelligence) subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence. In view of the particularly dynamic nature of scientific and technical intelligence, the Committee regarded

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it as inadvisable to embody in a National Security Council directive detailed allocations of production responsibility which should, in the nature of things, be subject to refinement and change without the necessity of applying to the National Security Council.

10. The Committee agreed, however, that DCID No. 3/3 constituted an inadequate implementation of the Council's Directive in the light of developments in the scientific and technical intelligence field. This Directive was regarded inadequate in the following respects:

a. Basic allocations of production responsibilities within the major subdivisions of the general field of scientific and technical intelligence are not to be found in DCID No. 3/3. The resulting confusion as to the responsibilities of the respective agencies has given rise to the likelihood of unreasonably overlapping efforts and a possibility that gaps in our intelligence coverage of this field will not be promptly identified and remedied.

b. DCID No. 3/3 was intended to provide adequate authority to implement the continuous program of coordination in the field of scientific intelligence required by NSCID No. 3, but, in practice, the SIC and the working committees did not so operate, largely because of differences in interpretations of the provisions of DCID No. 3/3 and NSCID No. 3 by the members of the SIC.

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11. In view of the above-mentioned deficiencies of DCID No. 3/3, this Committee determined in the first instance that there is required a more specific identification of the primary production responsibilities of the various interested departments and agencies in the fields of scientific and technical intelligence.

12. After consultation with appropriate scientific and technical intelligence specialists, the Committee developed specific allocations of primary production responsibility within three basic major subdivisions of the field of scientific and technical intelligence. These allocations are enumerated below and have been incorporated in the proposed DCID No. 3/4.

a. Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military materiel and techniques:--primary production responsibility of the Departments of the Department of Defense.

b. Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic sciences, on scientific resources, and on medicine (excluding military medicine), plus intelligence on pertinent applied research and development:--primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Agency.

c. Intelligence on Atomic Energy:--production responsibility of all interested agencies.

13. These proposed allocations are premised upon basic principles which are unanimously recognized and are of such importance that

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they have been included also in the proposed draft of DCID No. 3/4.
These basic principles are as follows:

- a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or necessarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activities.
- b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and finished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.
- c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dissents recorded.
- d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to fulfill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally be disseminated outside the producing agency without advance consultation with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject-matter involved.
- e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular field will develop special competence in that field and will normally carry out all or most of the research in that field.
- f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intelligence activities of its Technical Services and its

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other facilities having intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the intelligence produced by such Services and facilities.

14. It was further recognized by the Committee that despite the above-mentioned specific allocations of primary production responsibilities to the Military Services and CIA (as incorporated in the proposed DCID No. 3/4), the Military Services will also require intelligence indicating trends from fundamental research in basic sciences, which they normally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require intelligence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, and the technical characteristics of existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the Military Services. Accordingly, there will continue to exist areas of common or overlapping interest which will require continuing inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

15. The Committee's second major determination was that a new committee should be formed to supplant the SIC. The proposed DCID No. 3/4 provides for the establishment of such a committee, which may be called the Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC) and which should perform the functions of:

- a. Integrating scientific and technical intelligence as and when required for the production of national intelligence, and

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b. Stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate, and coordinating the production of Chapter VII of the NIS.

16. This Committee recommends that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occasion for activity on the part of the committee will arise when contributions are required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee's activities will be directed to synthesizing departmental intelligence, and while so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from the production activities of the respective departments and agencies, each operating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resolve conflicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views registered, for the benefit of the national intelligence production organization.

17. The SEC can best assist in the coordination of production of intelligence in scientific and technical fields by stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

18. Because of the recognized common interest of participating agencies in the atomic energy field, this Committee recommends that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee be continued in its present form and with its present functions. Appropriate provision

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for this continuation has been made in the proposed DCID No. 3/4.

19. Finally, a word of caution. As seen by this Committee, the major obstacle to a fully effective scientific intelligence effort appears to have been a lack of an agreed understanding on the part of the IAC agencies of their respective roles in this effort. The Committee believes that it is possible that other difficulties, and there are others, will tend to disappear if this major issue can be resolved. At any rate, the Committee considers that further directives and formal coordinating mechanisms ought not to be instituted unless experience shows that the simpler and more flexible arrangements herein proposed are inadequate. In this connection, the IAC should re-examine the problem in six months time with a view to determining whether further action is required.

Mr. Loftus E. Becker, CIA, Chairman

Date

Col. Floyd E. Dunn, Joint Staff

Date

Col. James F. Pinkney, USMC

Date

Col. G. B. Coverdale, Army

Date

Capt. Kenneth C. Hurd, Navy

Date

Mr. William C. Truchess, State

Date

Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, AEC

Date

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TAB A

July 1952

To report of the
Ad Hoc Committee
to Survey Scientific
& Technical Intelligence

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 3/4PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of HSCID No. 3, and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the following policies and operating procedures are hereby established:

1. Policies

In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting integration of intelligence, the interested departments and agencies will apply the following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or necessarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and finished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dissents recorded.

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d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to fulfill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally be disseminated outside the producing agency without advance consultation with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject-matter involved.

e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular field will develop special competence in that field and will normally carry out all or most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intelligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities having intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the intelligence produced by such Services and facilities.

2. Procedures:

a. Delineation of Dominant Interests. The general field of scientific and technical intelligence production is subdivided into three basic major areas, and allocation of primary production responsibilities therein is made as follows:

(1) Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military

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material and techniques:—primary production responsibility of the Departments of the Department of Defense, as exemplified in Annex A.

(2) Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic sciences, on scientific resources, and on medicine (other than military medicine) plus intelligence on pertinent

applied research and development:—primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Agency, as exemplified in Annex B.

(3) Intelligence on Atomic Energy - production responsibility of all interested agencies.

b. It is recognized that despite the above-mentioned specific allocations of primary production responsibilities to the Military Services and CIA, the Military Services will also require intelligence indicating trends from fundamental research in basic sciences, which they normally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require intelligence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, and the technical characteristics of existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the Military Services. Accordingly, there continue to exist areas of common or overlapping interest which require continuing inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

c. Coordinating Mechanisms

(1) The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is

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hereby reconstituted as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same structure and functions as before.

(2) Subject to the foregoing, there is hereby established the Scientific Estimates Committee, a permanent interdepartmental committee, to integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required, for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and guide inter-agency liaison and such working level conferences as may be appropriate, and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS.

(3) The Scientific Estimates Committee shall be composed of designated representatives as members from CIA, the Joint Staff, the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and such other ad hoc representatives as may be determined necessary by the regular committee members. In order to maintain continuity and stability, each department and agency mentioned above will designate a regular member and, if desired, an alternate by transmitting names and titles to the Director of Central Intelligence. This action will not preclude the designation of such additional persons as may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a particular subject under consideration

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by the committee. The Chairman will be elected annually.
The Committee will establish its methods of procedure.
The Central Intelligence Agency shall provide an executive secretary and secretariat as required.

(4) It is recommended that the SEC concentrate on the integration of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is responsible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence, and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occasion for activity on the part of the committee will arise when contributions are required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee's activities will be directed to synthesizing departmental intelligence, and while so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from the production activities of the respective departments and agencies, each operating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resolve conflicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views registered for the benefit of the national intelligence production organization.

(5) The SEC can best assist in the coordination of production of intelligence in scientific and technical

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fields by stimulating and guiding inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/3 is herewith rescinded.

WALTER B. SMITH
Director of Central Intelligence

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ANNEX A TO DCI DIRECTIVE 3/4

Responsibilities of the departments of the Department of Defense for intelligence on all weapons, weapon systems, equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques, including, for example:

- a. Aircraft and equipment, military, and civil
- b. Vessels and equipment
- c. Military motorized equipment
- d. Ordnance
- e. Military engineering equipment
- f. Railroad equipment (military types)
- g. Guided Missiles
- h. Military electronic systems and equipment
 - (1) Radar Equipment
 - (2) Electronic reconnaissance devices
 - (3) Electronic countermeasures
 - (4) Electronic navigational devices
 - (5) Telecommunications equipment
- i. Chemical Warfare
- j. Biological Warfare
- k. Military medicine, including
 - (1) Medical aspects of civil defense in the USSR.

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(2) Medical vulnerabilities of man and animals
to BW agents, and capabilities for medical defense of
man and animals against BW agents.

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ANNEX B TO DCI DIRECTIVE 3/4

Responsibilities of CIA (OSI) for Intelligence on Fundamental Research in the Basic Sciences, Basic Scientific Resources, and Medicine (excluding Military Medicine), plus Intelligence on Pertinent Applied Research and Development, including, for example:

1. Basic Sciences

- a. Biological and Medical sciences
- b. Chemistry
- c. Metallurgy
- d. Physics and Geophysics
- e. Mechanics
- f. Electromagnetic wave propagation and ionospherics
- g. Cosmic radiation and particles
- h. Thermodynamics, including low-temperature Physics
- i. Terrestrial Magnetism
- j. Meteorology
- k. Mathematics
- l. Astronomy

2. Basic Scientific Resources

- a. Magnitude and scale of scientific effort and achievement, including dependence on foreign science
- b. Scientific education and training
- c. The organization of science, academics, etc.

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- d. The operation, administration, and control of science, including scientific and technical planning and financing, and the exchange of information through publications and contacts
- e. Scientific manpower, its volume and composition
- f. Scientific laboratories and equipment, its quality and availability.
- g. History and philosophy of science
- 3. Medicine (for Medical Research, see paragraph 12)
 - a. Medical organization and administration medical activities of important foreign countries.
 - b. Organization and administration of veterinary medicine in important foreign countries.
 - c. Medical supply situation (particularly in the Soviet orbit).
 - d. Use of blood and blood substitutes in the Soviet orbit.

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